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Abstract
Did financial institutions with better governance arrangements weather
the recent financial crisis better? And how about those with more qualified
chairmen? We answer these questions in the context of the Spanish Savings
and Loans (Cajas). We find that neither formal governance institutions
(e.g. the way the board is appointed) nor real governance (e.g. the actual
composition of the board and the role played by political parties in it) are
highly correlated with the composition of the loan book at the peak of the
financial crisis (the size of the portfolios of real estate and individual loans)
or with the performance of these loans (the amount of non performing
loans in the crisis or the decrease in ratings). On the other hand, we find
a clear and significant impact of the human capital of the Caja chairmen
on the measures of loan book composition and performance. In particular,
we find that (1) Cajas whose chairman was previously a political appointee
have had significantly worse loan performance; (2) Cajas whose chairman
did not have postgraduate education have significantly worse performance;
and (3) Cajas whose chairman had no banking experience had significantly
worse performance.We examine the implications of these findings for our
understanding of the origins of the crisis and for the future regulation of the
Cajas.
∗We thank Miguel Anton, Gabriela Antonie, Manuel Huete, Raquel Vargas for excellent
research assistance and FEDEA for financial suport. We also thank Rafael Repullo for an
excellent discussion and the rest of the participants of the FEDEA conference “The Crisis of
the Spanish Economy,”which took place in October 2009 at the Bank of Spain, for very useful
comments.
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1 Introduction
In hindsight the signs of a developing housing bubble appear as clear in Spain
as in the US or Ireland: Real Estate prices grew, in real teams, by over 100%
between 1999 and 2007. And yet up to 2007 real estate loans continued funding
one of the largest real estate booms in the world, so that 860,000 housing starts
took place in 2006. Two thirds of the housing units built in Europe between
1999 and 2007 were built in Spain. By the end of the construction boom (end of
2008), the stock of loans to real estate developers and builders reached almost
500bn euros, equivalent to 50% of Spain’s GDP. This lending bonanza appears
foolish in hindsight: investment banks now estimate that up to 50% of loans to
developers will be irrecoverable.
Not all lenders took the same decisions. In fact, as we document below, the
performance differential between different lenders are huge: the share of real
estate loans in the Cajas books’ at the height of the boom (2006) ranges, in our
sample, between just over 10% and almost 50%, and the share of non-performing
loans in the Summer of 2009 also ranges widely, between just over 1% and close to
7%.1 The question we study in this paper is what accounts for such heterogeneity.
In particular, we study whether differences in human capital and in governance
can partly account for it.
Our analysis contributes to illuminate the general debate on decision making
up to the crisis on the conflicting role of incentives and bounded rationality
on it. One side of the debate argues that those in charge of the key decisions
may not have been informed enough, knowledgeable enough, or smart enough to
understand what they were doing- a case of ‘bounded rationality’; the other side
argues that they may have foreseen it, but it may not have been in their interest
to do the right thing–in other words, their incentives were misaligned, and the
corporate governance arrangements put in place by the shareholders and other
stakeholders did not impose the necessary discipline. Of course, a third option is
possible, namely that those lending decisions were, at the time, optimal and only
appear wrong-headed to us, in retrospect. Our data allows us to differentiate,
at least partially, among these three hypothesis, and thus, hopefully, will help us
clarify the general debate on the roots of the ongoing worldwide financial crisis.
Beyond these broad issues, we also to illuminate the current policy debate
in Spain on the regulation of this segment. Some of the Cajas are among the
most successful commercial banks in Spain, but there is a lot of heterogeneity
in their performance. Our aim is to explain part of this heterogeneity in perfor-
mance on the basis of governance and human capital issues. This is a particularly
1Or 17.3% if we include Caja de Castilla la Mancha, which has been taken over by the Bank
of Spain for prudential reasons. More on this later.
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important exercise since Cajas are an unusual segment of the Spanish financial
sector, characterized by heavy political involvement. As a result, moves towards
changing the regulation of the segment are continuously being discussed. More-
over, Cajas do not have tradeable participations and are not quoted in the stock
market- thus take-overs and other control mechanisms relying on the share price,
which play a role in banks, do not act as automatic disciplining channels here.
The incentive alignment problem takes a particular form in the Spanish Ca-
jas. Local governments and local political parties in Spain have a much closer
relationship with them than with private banks. Formally, a substantial propor-
tion of board members are directly appointed by local and regional governments.
Moreover, many other board members that are formally appointed by other types
of institutions (depositors, workers, founders. . . ) are often quite connected in the
political sphere.2 Political membership is known to be correlated with voting pat-
terns in boards and firm performance, and political connectedness of firms is also
related to the way legislators act when passing regulation that is important for
those same firms. 3 In this sense, it is reasonable to expect the level of political
involvement of their managers to matter. Some of these effects may be associated
with conflicting interests and thus affect performance negatively. Some others,
such as those derived from better coordination between banks and local govern-
ments, may be positive. The relative importance of each of these channels may
also be different during expansion times or during crises.
We study empirically how corporate governance matters by examining the
impact of the board composition and structure on loan losses, rating changes
and the composition of the loan portfolio. Pre-existing literature on Spanish
savings banks has focused on the effects of the formal level of political influence,
using information from the bylaws of the different savings banks. However, the
effective level of governance has attracted much less attention, probably due
to the difficulty of obtaining such information. In this paper we exploit new
information on the actual composition of the board, as well as on the connection
between it and political parties and institutions to study the effect of actual, as
oppose to formal, governance.
The alternative hypothesis implies that losses are the result of the absence of
knowledge or human capital of some of the leaders of the institution, who cannot
effectively monitor their subordinates, provide them with input in their decisions
and coordinate their efforts- the main roles of CEOs. To do this, we have hand-
2Sumner and Webb (2009) show how loans in commercial banking are linked to the compo-
sition of the board of the bank. Through a related argument Mian and Khwaja (2005) show
that politically connected firms get more loans from commercial banks.
3Mian, Sufi and Trebbi (2009) show how local legislators vote according to the needs of their
local financial institutions.
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collected data on curriculum vitaes, political affiliation, loan books, etc. of the
Chairmen of most Cajas over the last 9 years and constructed synthetic indexes
of the Chariman’s human capital for each Caja.4.
Our data allows us to reject the luck hypothesis. Under the null, that is if the
variance in lending decisions is the product of luck, the non-performing loans of
each Caja should not be related to either human capital or corporate governance
issues, after controlling for size and other systematic factors. In fact, we find
that there are clear and significant patterns in governance and human capital
of the Chairman that are correlated with its performance. Most significantly,
the human capital level of the Chairman of the Caja is closely correlated with
the loan portfolio of the Caja before the Crisis (in 2007) and with the loan
performance of the Caja during the crisis. In particular, a Caja run by someone
with post-graduate education, with previous banking experience, and with no
previous political appointments, is likely to have significantly less real estate
lending as a share of total lending, a larger share loans to individuals, a lower
rate of non-performing loans, and a lower downgrade in its rating.
Specifically, those Cajas led by Chairmen without graduate studies extended
7% more of their portfolio as loans to individuals and 5-7% less to real estate
loans. Consistently with this, as of July 2009, they had significantly lower non
performing loans, around 1% less. Given that the average in the sample is around
5%, this is a 20% drop just from this variable. Despite the fact that they were
more conservative during the boom, these Cajas also had 0.2% higher return on
assets (ROA) in 2006. The role of banking experience is also very significant:
Cajas led by those without banking experience had a 1% increase in non per-
forming loans; this also partly reflects a larger portfolio allocation to real estate,
of around 6% more. These two effects are cumulative, that is compared to one
who has graduate education and relevant experience, a chairman without both
increases current non performing loans in his Caja by 2 percent points. This
is a huge effect, of around 40% of non-performing loans. These numbers are
significant and quite precisely estimated.
As to political connections of the Chairman, having been an elected public
official previously had also significant effects on non-performing loans, with an
increase in around 0.8% of the share to the non performing loans for Cajas run
by previously elected public officials- that is political connections account for 1/5
of the average mean non-performing loan.
On the other hand, we find limited evidence that the composition of the
board of the Caja, even its politization, also have played a role. Taking all Cajas
together, the politization of boards seems to be correlated with less real estate
4Our results are robust to using, instead of a synthetic measure of average human capital,
the human capital of the current chairman.
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investments but this is largely driven by the subset of Basque Cajas. Once this
is factored in, those boards with a dominant party are in fact associated with
worse portfolio quality; clear effects cannot really be discerned.
Of course, all of these numbers have to be taken with the proverbial grain
of salt. First, we cannot actually prove any causal connection, of course- some
unobservable, third variable could account for both low human capital chairmen
and bad loan books. Second, our data are incomplete in some instances. We
have collected most data from public information, as we discuss below; public
information on chairmen of some Cajas is hard to come by.
A third worry, but one we are less concerned by, is hindsight bias— why focus
on one accident or bad event when it could be an inevitable side effect of good
choices or the result of bad luck? First, as we argued before, the bad luck version
of this hypothesis does not predict any correlation between failure and human
capital. Second, from a policy perspective, we believe that minimizing the risk
of default by a financial institution is an explicit aim of policy and thus failure
is a legitimate aim of research. Third, if risk taking is at stake, we expect the
same variables that predict worse performance in the crisis should predict better
performance beforehand. In fact, as we shall show, it is not the case that Cajas
more in trouble were more profitable previously. On the contrary, the same
factors that predict worse non-performing loan performance also predict lower
return on assets before the crisis.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the data sources and the
key stylized facts. Section 3 studies the more ‘traditional’ explanations, the
role of the Board of the Caja. It begins by considering the role of the formal
rules that determine the board composition and structures, and then studies the
available measures of ‘real’ political interference in the governing of the Cajas.
Section 4 presents the evidence on the role of Chairman’s human capital. Section
5 concludes.
2 Data and Empirical Approach
2.1 Data Sources
Our empirical analysis requires drawing data from a number of sources. Most of
these data was collected by us from a wide range of public sources. We collected
data on human capital of the current and past chairmen; on formal and effective
corporate governance; on the loan portfolio as of 2007; on ratings downgrades
between 2007 and now; and on the non performing loan as of July 2009.
We collected data on human capital (education, experience, political affil-
iations, and previous political experience) about the Chairmen of the savings
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banks using information available through the web sites of the Cajas and news
clippings about their appointment. This information was then supplemented by
additional information provided by some of the savings banks’ press offices that
have cooperated with us. Moreover, some additional information -contained in
the financial press, in the Boardex database and the Registro Mercantil- has also
been used to supplement it. Rather than using the human capital of any one past
or present Chairmen per Caja, we track the different Chairmen in charge of each
Caja from 2001 and construct the equivalent human capital and political back-
ground variables for a synthetic Chairman that is an average of the Chairmen
over the past 9 years weighted by the number of years that each Chairmen was in
charge. To collect information about the formal structure of the boards and the
financial links between Cajas and political parties we used Corporate Governance
Reports. Caja Chairmen have, by law or in practice, important executive roles,
regardless of the statutory responsibilities the rules give them.
We attempted to complete the public information collected over the summer
of 2009 by directly contacting all of the Cajas for whom the information was
missing. Sadly, perhaps because of the sensitivity of the issue, the response rates
were very low and almost no Cajas answered our request.
The dependent variables in all of our analysis are real estate loans, individ-
ual loans, changes in ratings and share of non performing loans. These came
from three different sources: the Annual Balances, the Savings banks’ Semian-
nual Reports results filed with the CNMV, and reports published periodically by
international rating agencies (S&P, Moody’s and Fitch)
For the ratings we transformed the data from the alphabetic (AAA etc.) codes
used by rating agencies to a numeric scale using the transformation proposed
by Miguel García-Posada y Josep M.a Vilarrubia (2008). In our regressions
we used every single piece of information we found, with one exception: the
non performing loan data for Caja Castilla la Mancha (CCM). By the time we
collected the non-performing loan information (the data are for the first semester
09, as of July 1, 2009) this institution had been taken over by the Bank of
Spain. While the distribution of non-performing loans for our sample without
CCM has a mean of 4%, a minimum of 1.75% and a maximum of 7.38%, CCM
reported non-performing loans of 17.3%, with a jump during the months of the
intervention of over 8%. We believe that this huge difference responds to very
different accounting standards used by Cajas accountants versus the Bank of
Spain.5 As a result of this non-comparability, we have run all of our regressions
without this value to avoid skewing our results.6
5See Cunat and Garicano “¿Para cuándo la reestructuración del sistema financiero español?”
El Pais, 13 September 2009.
6None of our results changes sign, and only one becomes non-significant, the coefficient on
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Figure 1:
2.2 Stylized Facts and Empirical Strategy
The key stylized fact we exploit is the relation between the portfolio allocation
decisions during the ‘bubble years’ (before 2007) and the pain that the banks
suffered later. Figure 1 serves as both data description and as a summary of this
relation. Clearly, larger shares of real estate loans and smaller shares of consumer
loans or ‘loans to individuals’ pre 2007 are correlated with higher default today
with higher delinquency rate as well as with higher downgrade probability. A
large part of the bad loan issues in Spain are derived from the 320bn euro stock
of loans allocated to real estate developers and 160bn euro of loans to builders..
Figure 1 shows that there is a wide dispersion in the allocation of loans to real
estate. The average of the 30 Cajas for which we have the 2007 real estate data
is 27.7%, with the share ranging from 13% to 44%. The share of non-performing
loans on July 1, 2009 varied widely, between 1.75% and 7.3%. Moreover, the
figure shows a very clear correlation between both.
Thus it is clear in hindsight that allocating a large share of the loan book
to real estate investments was a bad decision. Of course the question is whether
it was also the wrong decision ex ante. We cannot really have a firm view on
this without some analysis. Our aim here is simply to discover which specific
postgraduate education, if we include this outlayer. On the other hand the impact of appointing
politicians for non political board seats is strongly negative if we include CCM in the sample.
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characteristics of Caja’s boards and executives explain their portfolio decisions.
Under the null, where nothing could be known ex ante, we would not expect that,
for example, chairmen with higher levels of human capital would allocate lower
(or higher) fractions of their portfolios to real estate; or that those who are most
connected would instead allocate larger shares. Thus our tests, were we to find
clear relations between human capital, board structure or political connections
and portfolio decisions, would allow us to reject the null that the variation in
loan portfolio decisions was essentially random or due to ‘luck’.
Endogeneity and omitted variable biases are a serious concern throughout
this study. To some extent it is an unavoidable issue, since we cannot exploit the
panel data dimension of our information. Since performance during the current
crisis is the main focus of the article, we are implicitly imposing the cross-sectional
nature of the analysis. There are however some results that reinforce the validity
of the analysis: First, the inclusion in the regressions of size controls that could
be correlated with various omitted variables does not seem to affect our results
much. Second, here is substantial heterogeneity in performance for Cajas of
similar size and in the same region. Finally, some reverse causality concerns
along the lines of poor performing Cajas trying to improve their governance and
human capital should generate biases that go against our results.
3 Corporate Governance
Savings banks do not formally have shareholders. In terms of control rights, the
extended board of the savings banks constitutes the equivalent of a general share-
holders´ meeting. With respect to economic rights, the not for profit foundation
or ‘obra social’ is closest to a shareholder.
The extended board of savings banks is formed by representatives of the local
political authorities, representatives of the founders of the Caja, relevant social
institutions, workers and other stakeholders. Their mandate is to maximize the
long-term expected returns for the foundation; in this sense, their formal mandate
is not that different from the objectives that a regular shareholder in a private
bank would pursue. There is however a growing literature that shows that when
shareholders of private corporations have other interests in the firms on top of
maximizing the value of their shares, their voting patterns are affected.7 In the
case of savings banks it is conceivable that there is some degree of conflict of
interests between the maximization of a hypothetical shareholder’s value and the
objectives of the institutions present on the board.
7See among others the work of Agrawal (2008) on US union pension funds. Matvos and
Ostrovsky (2007) on the strategic interaction of activist funds and the analysis of Harford,
Jenter, and Li (2006) on how the levels of cross-ownership of shares affect merger negotiations.
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3.1 Formal governance institutions
The formal institutions on governance is the aspect of Spanish Cajas that has
attracted most interest in the academic literature. There is substantial hetero-
geneity in the way boards are appointed and this information is public. Several
studies have sought to exploit this information to study the influence of gover-
nance structures on performance. Garcia-Cestona and Surroca (2007) study the
differences in performance between Cajas formally controlled by non-political
institutions (mainly depositors and workers) and those controlled by local au-
thorities. They find that non-political Cajas focus on profit maximization and
on the universal access to financial services, leading to better performance. On
the contrary, contributing to regional development becomes the most favored goal
when public administrations control the bank. Illueca, Norden and Udell (2008)
show that Cajas are more likely to expand to other regions whenever the same
political party is dominant in both regions and the board of the Cajas is dom-
inated by local authorities. Several other studies have compared the efficiency
levels of Cajas and private commercial banks trying to elicit whether there is
a substantial difference in performance, in general with mixed results.8 While
these latter studies provide interesting evidence they have certain limitations.
Efficiency measures are generally unstable. Output measures and measures of
risk from banking balance sheet data are controversial and may not be very
informative during periods of expansion. Finally, these papers can exploit the
panel nature of balance sheet data, however, their main variables of interest (i.e.
the governance structure of savings banks) are in general constant through large
periods of time so the advantage of using panel data is somewhat limited.
Existing studies have mainly concentrated on one aspect of governance: the
extent of political influence on the savings banks and how it affects performance.
The effect of political influence is ex-ante not obvious from a theoretical point of
view. While stronger political influence may lead to conflicts of interest between
maximizing shareholder’s value and other objectives such as fostering regional
growth or directed lending, political connections may provide valuable human
capital related to institutional knowledge, private information or professional
networks. In fact, it has been shown empirically that political connectedness is
often valued by private corporations and that it affects firm value.9 Common
measures of political influence that have been used in the analysis of Spanish
savings banks include the share of board members appointed directly by local
authorities.
8See Salas, V. , J Saurina (2002), Tortosa, E. (2002), Crespi R., M. A. Garcia Cestona and
V. Salas (2004) among others.
9See for example Fishman (2001) and several follow-up papers.
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How do these measures relate to the loan performance of the Cajas? Table 1
analyzes this effect. Each cell represents a different regression.
Table 1: Corporate Governance 
 
 
Loans to Real 
Estate 
Loans to 
individuals 
Non Performing Loans Change in Rating 
(positive=increase) 
 
(I) (II) (I) (II) (I) (II) (I) (II) 
% politics 4.000 4.183 -22.56 -22.87 0.718 0.697 -0.340 -0.339 
 (12.55) (12.57) (14.82) (14.57) (1.615) (1.633) (0.244) (0.248) 
% founders 0.669 -3.753 -3.448 3.682 -4.474***  -4.523***  0.315 0.339 
 (11.80) (12.62) (14.49) (15.28) (1.557) (1.619) (0.245) (0.254) 
Herf. Board 
-2.465 -2.784 -9.966 -9.432 -2.702 -2.765 -0.249 -0.250 
 (20.05) (20.09) (24.57) (24.25) (2.912) (2.943) (0.421) (0.427) 
Observations 29 29 29 29 36 36 38 38 
size controls  yes  yes  yes  Yes 
Source: Corporate governance reports and own collection 
The first variable of interest is the % of board members that are formally
appointed through a political channel (local and regional governments). We do
not find substantial effects of this variable on the lending behavior and portfolio
performance of savings banks during this crisis. However we find mild negative
effects on the rating change (statistically significant at a 17% rate). The second
measure uses the % of board members that are appointed by the founders, which
has often been used as a measure of political independence (although it can
also be associated with different founder agendas). Again we do not find strong
results on portfolio composition; however loan portfolios perform much better
when there is a higher proportion of founders. The effect is quite strong both
economically and statistically, an extra 11% of representation of founders (one
standard deviation) leads to a DEcrease of 4.9% in the share of non performing
loans (2.9 standard deviations). Thus consistently with previous findings and the
theoretical hypothesis, the existence of a more independent boards is correlated
with better loan performance.
Weak boards and dispersed ownership have also been under the spotlight
as potential drivers of poor performance. Free riding and coordination failures
among shareholders and board members can be responsible for poor oversight
of management that leads to entrenched managers and poor performance. The
degree of concentration of a board may also be associated with political diversity.
To test these hypothesis we use as independent variable the Herfindahl index of
the representation of the different institutions that form the board. The results do
not show any strong patterns, with coefficients that are in general very imprecise.
Thus we do not find strong effects of formal measures of politization on port-
folio choice; when it comes to performance we do find a clear positive effect of
a larger founder share on non performing loan share and a mild negative effect
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of the % of politically appointed board members on the savings bank rating.
Overall, it formal governance measures do not show strong impacts on the per-
formance of the Spanish savings banks during the current crisis, in line with some
of the results in the preexisting literature that use more conventional performance
measures.10
Of course, one has to bear in mind that the channels through which board
members are appointed are only mildly correlated with the real level of political
involvement of the board members. One of the added values of this study is that
we collect public information about the board members and in particular we are
able to assess whether they belong to a political party or have been appointed
to political positions in the past. We move to this issue next.
3.2 ‘Real Governance’: Political Involvement and Loan perfor-
mance.
In this section we concentrate on the effects of ‘effective’ rather than formal,
political influence on performance during the current crisis. For this purpose,
we collected public information about the political connection of the different
presidents and board members of all the savings bank in our sample.11 Indi-
viduals were classified as politicians if they belonged to a political party or had
previously occupied politically appointed public positions. While public reports
in the press, personal and institutional web-pages may be an incomplete source
of information, it can still be treated as a valid proxy subject to measurement
error. If anything, it is conceivable that our variables underestimate the level
of political involvement of board members (i.e. some of them may not want to
publicize their political connections). However, we do not expect that biases in
terms of declaring a political membership should have a strong correlation with
performance.
Figure 2 shows the correlation between a formal measure of political involve-
ment (% of politically appointed seats) and a ‘real’ one (% of effective politicians).
The red 45% line allows us to see which Cajas have more politically connected
board members among those that are not formally appointed by political insti-
tutions. Cajas further out on the diagonal have more formal and real political
involvement. The correlation between the two variables is positive, but not high,
10Of course, this does not necessarily mean that governance issues are unimportant in this
case. Good governance is important for firms and even more so for savings banks that lack some
of the market-based discipline devices such as the information contained in their share prices
or hostile takeover threats. It may however reflect that the formal governance provisions across
savings banks are not that different or relevant to determine lending decisions.
11The sources of this public information are boardex, the public web pages of the institutions,
news and publicly available web pages.
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Figure 2:
0.32. Similarly if we regress the percentage of politically connected board mem-
bers on the percentage of board members that are formally politically appointed
we find a coefficient of 0.42 that is statistically significant at a 5% level.12 This
means that the percentage of members that are politically appointed is possibly
a valid proxy for political influence, but it is subject to a lot of noise. Given that
formal measures of political influence are questionable and the limitations of tra-
ditional efficiency measures, we believe that going further towards measuring the
extent of effective political influence in the Caja can be useful.
Table 2 uses as independent variables different measures of effective political
influence. To measure the extent of political influence, we use the percentage
of politicians in the board and the percentage of the board controlled by the
largest party, as well as the Herfindahl index of the representation of the political
parties. Surprisingly, the three variables seem to have a strong impact on the
portfolio composition of savings banks, with more political and boards with a
high representation of the top party choosing a more conservative portfolio. This
could be interpreted as a positive impact of politicians on boards, however the
12Note that a majority of Cajas has a higer "real" amount of politicians than "formal".
Board seats that are formally non political (employees, founders, depositors...) are often filled
by politicians, while the opposite is less common.
12
results in the last four columns show that this conservativeness, does not translate
into a better portfolio performance.
Table 2: Politics and Performance  
 
Panel A 
Explanatory Variable 
Real Estate Loans 
 
Loans to individuals 
 
Non performing 
Loans 
Change in Rating 
(positive=improve) 
 (I) (II) (I) (II) (I) (II) (I) (II) 
% Politicians -12.15*  -14.03** 8.201 10.92 0.291 0.371 0.143 0.155 
 
(6.697) (6.695) (8.692) (8.606) (1.087) (1.116) (0.152) (0.157) 
Herfindahl  Parties -29.40***  -30.98*** 30.63** 33.12**  -1.576 -1.520 0.247 0.258 
 
(10.58) (10.44) (13.73) (13.30) (1.696) (1.730) (0.245) (0.250) 
% top Party -20.95***  -22.29*** 19.45* 21.49**  -0.778 -0.732 0.133 0.141 
 
(7.526) (7.419) (9.948) (9.670) (1.204) (1.229) (0.172) (0.176) 
Pol iticians in non political seats -4.125 -3.713 3.375 2.367 0.0925 0.0592 0.138 0.150 
 
(3.935) (4.276) (6.486) (6.987) (0.552) (0.582) (0.0869) (0.0970) 
Observations 30 30 30 30 38 38 39 39 
Include size controls?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
      Source:  Corporate governance reports and own collection 
 
Panel B: Including dummy for Basque Cajas 
 
Explanatory Variable 
Real Estate Loans 
 
Loans to individuals 
 
Non performing 
Loans 
Change in Rating 
(positive=improve) 
 (I) (II) (I) (II) (I) (II) (I) (II) 
% Politicians -6.473 -8.576 -2.995 -0.0259 2.294* 2.452**  0.0203 0.0317 
 
(7.655) (7.679) (9.420) (9.338) (1.142) (1.170) (0.176) (0.182) 
Herfindahl  Parties -23.91 -25.94* 13.78 16.92 1.869 2.008 -0.0364 -0.0240 
 
(14.55) (14.37) (18.38) (17.80) (2.121) (2.165) (0.328) (0.335) 
% top Party -16.40*  -17.85* 9.234 11.44 1.054 1.133 -0.0257 -0.0179 
 
(8.835) (8.704) (11.28) (10.92) (1.339) (1.366) (0.202) (0.207) 
Pol iticians in non political seats 0.208 1.582 -3.292 -5.940 0.698 0.722 0.117 0.127 
 
(3.090) (3.152) (5.475) (5.472) (0.520) (0.560) (0.0940) (0.108) 
Observations 30 30 30 30 38 38 39 39 
Include size controls?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Source: Corporate governance reports and own  collection 
A closer inspection of the independent variables shows an important pattern:
the three savings banks in the Basque country, BBK, Kutxa and Caja Vital,
rank 1st, 2nd, and 4th in terms of the percentage of politically connected board
members. The three of them also had a conservative portfolio approach during
the crisis. This may be due to a positive effect of political influence, but it could
be determined by exogenous factors as well, such as different industrial basis in
the Basque region.13
For this reason, in panel B of the table we also show tables in which we include
a dummy for the three Basque savings banks. In this alternative specification,
the effect of political influence has a neutral effect on the portfolio choice of the
savings banks but it raises the amount of non performing loans, that is, outside
the three Basque savings banks political influence seems to have a negative impact
in loan portfolio quality.
13 In particular BBK ranks 1st in percentage of politicians and last in real estate loans.
13
We also measure the percentage of politicians in seats that, in principle, are
not appointed by political bodies (depositors, employees). This measure indicates
that some board members that should, in principle, be independent from the local
government may in fact be highly aligned with it.14 Again, the measure seems
to have no impact on portfolio choice or performance.15
Overall we find some evidence of positive effects of board politization on the
portfolio choice of savings banks. Banks with lower politically connected board
members, those without a dominant party and those with a high concentration
of political parties had less exposure to real estate risks. This effect is largely
explained by the three Basque savings banks. In terms of performance, once these
three savings banks are excluded, we find negative effects of political influence
on non-performing loans.
We have several reasons to think that the effect of boards on performance
may not be statistically strong. First, a combination of positive and negative
results associated with political influence. Second, poor statistical power of our
tests due to the necessarily small cross-section of observations that we need to use
once we concentrate on the current crisis. Finally, we could be observing in Cajas
the phenomenon of “weak boards” that has been observed for firms in general.
If boards do not have strong powers to limit the decisions of the executives of
the firm, then it is normal that board characteristics of any kind do not affect
firm performance. If this was the case, to find alternative channels of political
influence we need to either concentrate higher up in the hierarchy of the firm or
to use proxies of political influence that come from the firm itself. We therefore
concentrate from now on direct lending to political parties; we later study the
impact of the political affiliation of the bank chairman.
In terms of direct financial links with political parties, we measure the total
amount of loans given to political parties, a ratio of the total amount of loans
relative to the total loans+deposits of the savings bank and a herfindahl index of
the loans given by political party that measures whether loans are concentrated
on one or few parties. Table 3 shows the results of these regressions.
14Note that this regression only contains 14 observations as many cajas do not have clear
"non politically appointed" board seats.
15However once CCM is included in the sample it has a very strong and negative impact on
the proportion of non performing loans.
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 Table 3: Loans to Political Parties and Performance  
 
Real Estate Loans 
 
Loans to individuals 
 
Non performing 
Loans 
Change in Rating 
(positive=improve) 
 (I) (II) (I) (II) (I) (II) (I) (II) 
Total Loans -0.203 -0.289 0.295* 0.330 -0.0102 -0.0569 0.00348 0.00908 
 (0.132) (0.239) (0.162) (0.295) (0.0241) (0.0427) (0.00337) (0.00602) 
Loans over 
loans+deposits 0.427 0.275 -0.0605 0.209 0.183 0.197 0.0110 0.0121 
 (1.246) (1.259) (1.558) (1.545) (0.166) (0.169) (0.0238) (0.0244) 
Herfindahl Loans -3.476 -4.729 1.556 3.508 0.893 0.927 0.0532 0.0576 
 (5.296) (5.374) (6.649) (6.654) (0.631) (0.641) (0.0949) (0.0972) 
Observations 30 30 30 30 38 38 39 39 
Include size controls?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Source: Corporate governance reports  
While political lending is often exemplified as a potential manifestation of
conflicts of interests in the savings banks, the results on these variables do not
show a clear pattern in terms of their influence on performance measures. In
general the loans to political parties represent a small proportion in terms of
the total portfolio of the savings banks and the lending is often quite diversified
among political parties, so it may be the case that it is not a good proxy for
politization. Furthermore we do not have good measures of directed lending,
that is, lending that is politically motivated but is not direct lending to political
parties.
The full picture with respect to the political influence of savings banks shows
little clear impact either way of the board composition and possible politization
on the loan portfolios and loan performance of different Cajas. We move now
on to study our next hypothesis: does the human capital of the Caja chairman
matter?
4 Does it pay to have a knowledgeable chairman?
Previous literature has identified several roles for those at the top of the manage-
rial hierarchy: coordinating among different units (see Hart and Moore 2005);
monitoring subordinates (e.g. Qian, 1994) or dealing with the exceptional issues
(e.g. Garicano, 2000). Without the right knowledge, Chairmen cannot properly
undertake these roles.
This is particularly true in the case of portfolio allocation decisions and loan
risk taking. It is a critical determinant of the performance of a financial institu-
tion, and thus cannot really be delegated; and it requires some relatively arcane
knowledge. For example, such decisions require understanding statistical con-
cepts such as covariance or correlation, finance concepts such as value at risk or
‘beta’ etc. It is unlikely that those without adequate education or experience can
undertake such roles. For example, absent some finance knowledge it is likely the
15
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Figure 3:
math whizzes from trading divisions can outargue the CEO at any time.
Thus we hypothesize that the absence of post-graduate education at the top
as well as of banking experience hampers decision making at the top of the Caja
and thus is linked to worse loan performance and excessive risk taking.
Only 1/3 of the 45 last chairmen in the sample have some form of postgrad-
uate education, either in the form of studies abroad, master or Ph.D. degrees.
On the other hand, half of the chairmen of the Cajas have some previous bank-
ing experience. These two dimensions of human capital are not correlated- the
correlation coefficient is .01.
Figure 3 presents the portfolio choices of those current chairmen with and
without postgraduate degrees with respect to the ones without. It shows that
the Cajas led by chairmen with postgraduate degrees had a 5.6 percent points
smaller real estate loan portfolio as a share of total loans than those led by
chairman with those loans, more individual loans, 6 points more of loans to
individuals. As a result, they had less non performing loans and fewer ratings
downgrades.
Figure 4 undertakes the same exercise for banking experience. Although the
differences in share of real estate loans have the same sign — those with more ex-
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Figure 4:
perience allocated less loans to real estate, here the difference is not significant as
we’ll see below. On the other hand, there is sharp and clear difference in the frac-
tion of non-performing loans: those banks whose chairmen had previous banking
experience had almost 2% less, on our preferred specification, non performing
loans. This difference is very large: given that the average Caja had 4.93% of
non-performing loans, having a president with banking experience reduces by
40% the amount of non-performing loans.
The results in Figures 3 and 4 apply to the last chairman of each of the Cajas.
However banking portfolios build up over several years and some of these CEO´s
may have inherited loan portfolios that were the result of previous policies that
are hard to undo. Moreover some Cajas have recently replaced their chairmen.
The replacement chairman and the event of a succession itself are likely to be
correlated with performance. For this reason we track the different chairmen
in charge of each Caja from 2001 and construct the equivalent human capital
and political background variables for a synthetic chairman that is an average of
the chairmen over the past 9 years weighted by the number of years that each
chairman was in charge. We then run regressions of the different performance
17
variables on the characteristics of these synthetic chairmen. These regressions
allow us to see the joint impact of the variables and to control for size. This
is important as our results could reflect simply a size bias- that is, larger Cajas
could have better loan portfolios and larger Cajas could have managers with
more education and experience, making the correlation spurious.
Table 4a presents this analysis. There are 5 specifications for each variable,
so that each panel presents five regressions on each of our dependent variables,
real estate and individual loans, non performing loans and rating increase. The
first column in each panel shows the joint effect of all variables and the columns
(II) to (IV) present each of the variables as a separate regressor.
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Table 4a: Chairman´s human capital and political background and performance 
Expl Variable Loans Real Estate Loans to Individuals 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
                  
Graduate Studies -5.897** -7.174**   7.075* 7.249*    
 (2.557) (2.774)   (3.632) (3.537)    
Public Office -2.586  -4.833  -1.449  0.892   
 (2.523)  (2.898)  (3.583)  (3.731)   
Banking 
Experience -6.462**   -7.375** 5.142   5.628 
 (2.443)   (2.662) (3.469)   (3.541) 
Turnover (billion) -15.3 -26.7 -14.4 -10.7 35.7 40.4* 31.9 26.3 
 (16.3) (17.7) (18.8) (17.4) (23.2) (22.5) (24.1) (23.2) 
Intercept 34.69*** 31.76*** 31.15*** 31.07*** 43.71*** 44.58*** 47.28*** 45.88*** 
 (2.050) (1.867) (2.135) (1.654) (2.911) (2.380) (2.749) (2.200) 
            
Observations 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
R-squared 0.428 0.227 0.125 0.249 0.258 0.191 0.067 0.145 
         
Expl Variable Non Performing Loans Change in Rating (positive=increase) 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
                  
Graduate Studies -0.963** -0.773    0.00689 0.0209    
 (0.461) (0.496)    (0.0693) (0.0732)    
Public Office 0.820*  0.452   0.0486  0.0713   
 (0.444)  (0.485)   (0.0663)  (0.0685)   
Banking 
Experience -1.242***   -1.164** 0.167**   0.174** 
 (0.450)   (0.474) (0.0687)   (0.0667) 
Turnover (billion) 2.04 0.80 1.25 3.27 -0.16 0.127 0.050 -0.146 
 (3.09) (3.34) (3.39) (3.24) (0.479) (0.498) (0.489) (0.462) 
Intercept 4.294*** 4.290*** 3.714*** 4.321*** -0.241*** -0.171*** -0.200*** -0.214*** 
 (0.367) (0.322) (0.368) (0.276) (0.0561) (0.0474) (0.0512) (0.0388) 
            
Observations 37 37 37 37 38 38 38 38 
R-squared 0.293 0.072 0.030 0.155 0.179 0.004 0.031 0.165 
 Note: Standard errors in parentheses     Source: Own collection from public information. 
 
 
Graduate studies are most significant and important. Those with graduate
studies (a masters, a doctorate, or studies abroad) extended 7% more of their
portfolio as loans to individuals, and around 6-7% less to real estate. Consistently
with this, as of July 2009, they had significantly lower impaired loans, around
1% less; and were less likely (although this is not always statistically significant)
to experience a downgrade.
The role of banking experience is also significant, but less straightforward:
banking experience reduces current non performing loans ratios by an additional
1%. This also partly reflects an increase in the portfolio allocation to real estate
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all regressions show a consistent drop of around 6-7% in this allocation. This
gets reflected on a lower chance of the debt of the Caja being downgraded that
is also statistically significant.
A common view on the chairmen of Spanish Cajas is that it is often a job
for retiring politicians. The next set of regressions studies the extent to which
being a previous appointee to public office affects the performance of the Caja.
Of course, having political experience and connections could be a plus, in that
it can provide the Caja with access to information and projects that it would
not have otherwise. Thus it is an empirical question whether the Chairman’s
political connections and experience harm or hurt the Caja.
The point estimates of the regressions on Table 4a, columns (III) show that
it does indeed have a negative impact although the effect is not significant when
used as a stand alone variable. When including all variables together, having held
previously elected political office is correlated with an increase in non performing
loans of the Caja of approximately 1%.
These effects are additional to one another: since they are uncorrelated,
putting them together in the regression hardly reduces their size. This can be
seen on column (I) of each panel which is our preferred specification. Thus we
can conclude that compared to one who has graduate education and relevant ex-
perience, a chairman without both increases current non performing loans by 2.1
percent points; since non-performing loans average around 4%, this is roughly a
50% increase in non performing loans, and larger than one standard deviation of
this variable. Moreover, using the estimates in column (I) we can see that having
a chairman without experience and graduate education who has previously held
public office increases these effect to 3%, around two standard deviations, in non
performing loans. Although causality is hard to establish in this setting, this
suggests that non performing loans of an average Caja would increase from 4%
to 7% in this case.16
Note that the differences in observable skills of the different chairmen of the
Cajas need not be large to lead to large economic losses. Given the nature of
the financial sector with large and highly levered institutions, small differences in
16A potential concern is that the nature of the analysis involves the use of a small sample
of observations. Even though these observations constitute the population of all the Cajas in
Spain (excluding the smaller rural Cajas) it could be the case that the results are driven by
few observations. To address this concern, in Table 4b in the Appendix, we perform median
regressions along the lines of Table 4. We find that graduate studies and previous banking ex-
perience are both strongly correlated with lower loans to real estate, higher loans to individuals,
higher non performing loans and lower chances of a downgrade. The results on the public office
variable are however more ambiguous, although are key result with respect to this variable still
holds, that is we still find a large (increasing non performing loans by 1 full point or 25% of the
average), positive and significant effect of public office on share of non performing loans.
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the rates of return achieved by different chairmen lead to large economic losses
when translated into monetary terms.17 Even though those chairmen that in
our sample appear as less able to run the Cajas may in fact be very skilled
individuals, the difference in skill with respect to those that seem to be optimal
is correlated with large differences in performance. As a back of the envelope
calculation, we can make the inference of what would have happened if each
and every Caja in our sample had been run by the optimal chairman (ie. an
experienced, formed and non politically connected one ), under the assumption
that we can interpret causally the coefficients. This exercise yields that the total
amount of impaired loans of the whole system would have gone down by 16
billion euro. Assuming a common conventional recovery rate for impaired loans
of 35% this would translate into losses of 10 billion euro. This inference has to be
taken with some care, as chairmen may differ in unobservables that are correlated
with size and performance but gives an impression of the size of the effects at
work. It also talks to the controversy about incentive pay and large bonuses in
the financial sector. While paying large bonuses to non performing executives is
obviously a poor policy, setting a high pay seems like a good one whenever it is
a necessary condition to attract high skill individuals.
Another important concern is that all the effects may be due to bad luck. If
a given type of Caja was concentrating on real estate loans which were profitable
for a while but proved a bad gamble ex-post. For this reason we regress in Table
4b the same set of variables against a the Return on Assets of the Caja in 2006.18
17See Gabaix and Landier (2007) for a more general and formal argument on the influence of
size on the returns to skill of the CEOs of large corporations.
18The return on assets excludes in the calculation of returns those that are atypical and do
not belong to the regular banking business (e.g. the revaluation of non financial assets).
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Table 4b: Chairman´s human capital and political background and past performance  
  ROA (smoothed) 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
          
Graduate Studies 0.206** 0.240**    
 (0.0987) (0.103)    
Public Office 0.162*  0.199*   
 (0.0938)  (0.0990)   
Banking Experience 0.167   0.195* 
 (0.102)   (0.109) 
Turnover (billion) -0.48 -0.07 -0.33 -0.59 
 -0.722 -0.731 -0.741 -0.772 
Intercept 0.677*** 0.799*** 0.776*** 0.841*** 
 (0.0805) (0.0637) (0.0766) (0.0585) 
       
Observations 43 43 43 43 
R-squared 0.243 0.122 0.094 0.076 
 Note: Standard errors in parentheses     
 
The results with respect to graduate studies and banking experience are in
line with the performance of the Cajas during the crisis. Experienced and more
educated chairmen performed better both before the crisis and during the crisis.
This is an important piece of information; the poor results during the crisis do
not seem to be the result of some Cajas taking more risk by taking advantage of
the very profitable real estate market and then being hurt by an unforeseeable
crisis. If that was the case, those Cajas that perform worse during the crisis
would also be those that perform better during the housing bubble as it would
correspond to a "bad gamble" hypothesis. The results not only do not show
such relationship but instead show that experienced and better trained chairmen
performed better both before and after the crisis.
The results with respect to previous political appointments are however dif-
ferent in this sense. In normal times it seems that those Cajas with a chairman
that had a previous political position perform better. In this particular dimen-
sion the hypothesis that those Cajas with a politically connected chairman took
risks in good times that turned out costly after the crisis seems to be supported
by the data. However in Table 4a the exposure to real estate loans does not seem
to be higher for politically connected chairmen so it is not clear that real estate
was the dimension of such gamble. We leave for future research the exploration
of this result.
Although making causal statements is difficult, and even though we could
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not obtain data on these sensitive issues for many Cajas, our results are strongly
suggestive: we believe that using the Cajas as a political sinecure has proven
extremely costly to the Spanish financial system.
5 Andalucía: A tale of four Cajas
In this section we illustrate some of the issues exposed in the previous sections
using as a case study the evolution of the savings banks in Andalucía. The current
four Cajas are the result of a consolidation and expansion process over the last
50 years. Despite the relatively level playing field for all the institutions, their
performance is quite heterogeneous. In order to add some texture to our study,
we study how this differential performance relates to the two main elements of
our study, corporate governance and human capital differences.
There are currently four main savings banks in Andalucía: Cajasol, Caja de
Granada, CajaSur and Unicaja, with a fifth smaller bank Caja de Jaen. All of
them resulted from different consolidation processes of smaller banks according
to the following diagram.
In terms of total deposits, in 1940 the sum of the parts of Cajasol was clearly
the dominant player but during the 40s and 50s, and till today Unicaja became
the dominant savings bank in Andalucia. The picture with respect to the total
amount of credit given is slightly different: the relative share of loans exhibits
much more volatility, as loans are more sensitive to economic fluctuations than
deposits. Both Cajasol and CajaSur became more loan oriented towards the year
2000.
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5.1 Performance
Table 5 shows the evolution of the relative size of deposits, loans and the ac-
counting value of equity with respect to the total of Andalucia during the period
2000-2006. This is a period of great expansion of the financial sector as a whole
and the savings banks in Andalucia are no exception. Table 5 Panel A presents
this data in relative terms in order to assess the different business strategies used.
Table 5: Recent Evolution Andalucian Cajas 
 
Panel A: Loan and Deposit Shares  
 Deposits 
2000 
Deposits 
2006 
Loans 
2000 
Loans 
2006 
Equity 
2000 
Equity 
2006 
Unicaja 34.80% 31.64% 30.05% 32.48% 36.96% 43.09% 
Caja Sol 29.44% 31.76% 32.93% 31.84% 29.04% 26.79% 
Caja Sur 19.89% 19.63% 20.43% 19.38% 19.71% 15.34% 
Caja Granada 15.06% 15.82% 15.77% 15.24% 12.84% 13.64% 
   Source: Anuario Estadístico de las Cajas de Ahorros, de 2006 
 
Panel B: Loan Composition and Performance 
 % Real 
Estate (06) 
% Loans to 
individuals 
(06) 
% Non 
Performing 
(09) 
Current 
Rating 
Rating drop 
Unicaja 24% 50% 2.9% AA3 No 
Caja Sol 32% 53% 4.5% A- No 
Caja Sur 28% 40% 7.8% BB+ 0.23 
Caja Granada 28% 55% - BBB+ 1.59 
   Source: Fitch Ratings Agency; 09 S1 Report at CMNV.  
Unicaja stands out as the most conservative savings bank of all four during
this period, its relative share of deposits falls by 3.2% and its relative size in
terms of loans increases by roughly 2%, however, simultaneously, Unicaja has
reinforced its solvency levels representing over 40% of the relative size in terms
of own equity. Cajasol moderated its previous expansion during the 90s and
shows a relatively healthy picture, with a moderate reduction in equity. CajaSur
, on the contrary shows signs of poor performance with its loans to equity ratio
increasing from 103% to 126% and becoming the largest of all four savings banks.
Caja Granada shows a very stable picture although its relative level of own equity
is also quite low throughout the whole period.
The picture during the current crisis reinforces the trends seen over the last
decade. Panel B on Table 5 shows our main variables of interest for the four main
savings banks in Andalucía. The two good performers are Unicaja and Cajasol
. Unicaja has been the Caja that has suffered least from the crisis. The share of
loans that are related to real estate is the lowest in the region and it also shows
healthy figures in terms of non performing loans. Not surprisingly, it has the
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highest long term credit rating of all four, which has remained stable during the
whole period. Cajasol on the other hand has expanded aggressively during the
last two decades and as a result a higher share of its loans belongs to real estate.
It also has relatively high levels of non performing loans. However the long-term
rating is still good and it has not suffered a drop during the period that we study.
While Unicaja and Cajasol show different paths within a good solvency situ-
ation, CajaSur , on the contrary, shows signs of being under a lot of stress during
the current crisis. It has a high share of real estate loans, and its loans are per-
forming much worse than the ones of its counterparts. Not surprisingly its rating
has been downgraded and it is currently just above investment grade. Finally
Caja Granada shows a mixed profile, it has been a more conservative institution
than CajaSur with less growth throughout the last 10 years but suffering more
in terms of its rating.
While a small sample of four savings banks cannot be used to make any
statistical inference, the case of the savings banks in Andalucía is interesting
insofar the size of the four main banks is very similar and they operate under
similar institutional and business circumstances. However their performance has
been widely different. Overall, Unicaja has been solid and it continues to be the
leader of the sector in Andalucía. Cajasol has embarked in an aggressive growth
path that has not created so far substantial solvency problems. Caja Granada
and CajaSur show a much grimmer picture, particularly in the case of CajaSur
where solvency problems are quite acute. It is important to understand to what
extent formal corporate governance, political influence and human capital issues
can be partly responsible for the differences in performance.
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5.2 Why this divergence in performance?
Table 6: Understanding Recent Evolution: Potential Explanations 
  
Panel A: Politics, Board 
 PSOE/UGT PP Other Political 
Unicaja 45% 5% 15% 
Caja Sol 52.5% 10% 7.5% 
Caja Sur 30% 10% 5% 
Caja Granada 25% 20% 5% 
 
Panel B: Human Capital and Political Affiliation CEO 
 Political 
Party CEO 
Education  Related 
Experience 
Turnover 
Unicaja PSOE Since 91  
PhD in 
Economics 
Yes 1 since 91 
Caja Sol PSOE Economist, 
PhD and 
MBA studies 
Yes 1 since 
founding (06) 
previous 
multiple 
Caja Sur Catholic Last 3, 
Catholic 
priests;  
theologician 
No 3 since 97 
Caja Granada  Last 3, no 
training in 
business and 
economics 
N 4 since 94 
 
Panel C: Compensation at Andalucian Cajas 
 Total pay Per board 
member 
Per billion 
Business 
Front vs. Back 
Unicaja 4.6m 231k 94.5k 1.42 
Caja Sol 1.7m 45k 39.7k 0.97 
Caja Sur 1.8m 90k 65.3k 0.86 
Caja Granada 1.1m 55k 49.6 1.33 
 
Formal and Real Governance. In terms of formal governance all four
savings banks are quite similar, Unicaja and Caja Granada are the ones with a
lower number of board seats formally appointed by political institutions (35%)
and a very dispersed representation on the rest of the seats Cajasol has a higher
percentage of politically appointed board members 45% and CajaSur . All in all
it seems that institutionally the four institutions are not substantially different
to each other or to the rest of the savings banks in Spain. Similarly to our
results with respect to all the Spanish savings banks there does not seem to be
a clear pattern with respect to performance and the composition of the board,
both formally and effectively. However the pattern is more consistent when we
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concentrate on the political affiliation of the president of the savings banks.
Human Capital. In terms of human capital the only savings bank that
has been consistently run by someone with knowledge of finance or economics
is Unicaja. Run by since 1991 Braulio Medel who has experience as an entre-
preneur and Ph.D. in Economics and some past academic activities. Cajasol is
also run since the merger that constituted it as such in 2006 by an economist
Antonio Pulido, former academic with a Ph.D. and MBA studies. Other than
these two presidents, the recent and current presidents of the different savings
banks do not have specific economic training, although most of them had profes-
sional experience in other areas such as law, medicine or engineering. The last
3 presidents of CajaSur were all catholic priests formed as theologists. None of
the last 3 presidents of Caja Granada had any specific formation in economics
or business administration.
As for the political connections variables that our analysis above found rele-
vant, a substantial proportion of all the presidents of Cajasol and Caja Granada
during the past two decades are linked to the regional government either through
direct membership to the same party (PSOE) or by having occupied publicly
appointed positions in the past. The presidents of CajaSur have, on the contrary
been normally linked to the catholic church which is itself linked to the founding
body of CajaSur . Finally Unicaja has had a single president for the last 18
years who is not formally linked to any political party; however he had a political
position linked to PSOE as deputy minister of economics and treasury.19
Compensation and Turnover: The turnover of chairmen and presidents
has also been analyzed as a source of inefficiencies. While too little turnover may
be an indication of entrenchment, excess turnover of presidents can also show of
lack of continuity and poor governance. In this sense, CajaSur has had 3 different
presidents since 1997, Caja Granada 4 different presidents since it was founded in
1992. Cajasol has had a single president since it was founded in 2006, although
the different savings banks that composed it often exhibited a high turnover of
presidents. Finally Unicaja stands out again in this dimension, with a single
president since 1971. While it is not possible to extract strong conclusions from
such a small sample it seems that stability at the top of the institution may be
either one of the driving factors of success or a manifestation of lack of problems.
It’d be of interest to now the level of human capital below the top level in
the Cajas. Although we cannot access data on the full hierarchies of the different
savings banks, we can get a sense of the importance given to human capital
by studying how much pay is devoted to top employees. It is easy to see that
again Unicaja is the savings bank that devotes more resources to paying its top
19More precisely he was "Viceconsejero de Economia y Hacienda" between 1984 and 1997.
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executives both in absolute terms, in per capita terms and relative to its own
resources. It also pays relatively more to the executive board members that deal
with strategic issues (Consejo) relative to those that deal with pure governance
issues (Comisión de Control). This may give Unicaja an advantage in terms of
attracted external professional and talented individuals.
Conclusion. Overall, even though a case study like this cannot be inter-
preted as conclusive statistical evidence, the big picture of the savings banks in
Andalucía gives a pretty consistent image that seems to support the evidence
of the rest of the study. Despite the fact that in terms of business conditions
all four savings banks have similar common grounds, there is substantial hetero-
geneity in performance, both historically but more importantly during the recent
crisis. Unicaja stands out as the leading institution and Caja Sol seems to be
on a stable path after completing a relatively successful expansion. On the other
end, Caja Granada seems to underperform with respect to its peers and CajaSur
seems to be experiencing moderate to large solvency problems. With respect to
the variables that explain these performance differences, the formal and effective
composition of the board seems to be uncorrelated with performance, however
the level of political independence and human capital of the presidents of each
institution is again positively correlated with performance: the ability and will-
ingness to attract and place skilled workers at the top of a Caja is a crucial
determinant of its lending performance.
6 Conclusions and Discussion
The main result of our analysis concerns the cost of the lack of human capital of
those running a Caja. We find (see Table 4) that in total the lack of human capital
of those running the Cajas adds around 3 points to their non performing loan
ration: having been an elected politician adds .82 points, not having postgraduate
education .96 and having no previous experience 1.24. Since the average non
performing loan in our sample is 4.05% (standard deviation of 1.24%) and the
average Caja loan book is 19800m euro, under the assumption that this is a causal
relationship, we can calculate the monetary cost of this lack of human capital
for an average Caja. Specifically, it would suffer on average 1399m euro in non
performing loans, rather than 801.9m euro average, that is the lack of human
capital would add 598m euro of non performing loans. Assuming a recovery
rate of .35, this extra bad loans would add 389m euros to the 641m in expected
losses. Assuming the obra social gets a payout of 20%, this is an additional of
77m euro loss to the obra social and an additional 311m solvency loss. These
results are robust and do not seem to be driven by few Cajas. Moreover those
presidents of Cajas that performed worse during this crisis were also the ones
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that were performing worse right before it. The implication is obvious: the cost
of appointing the wrong chairman costs the taxpayer and society more than the
cost of hiring the right one and still paying a hefty salary to the wrong one.
Of course, this calculation has to be qualified, since we could not run anything
close to an experiment comparing similar Cajas with different human capital
endowments. Probably, other variables are related to choosing underqualified
chairmen. In of this caveat, we believe that the result is useful, as it focuses
researchers on the key, uncontroversial in our view, fact that must be explained:
in the run-up to the crisis and during the crisis, Cajas that had less qualified
chairmen had worse performance.
Our interpretation is as follows. Running a bank is a hard business. It requires
expertise. It is unlikely that those whose previous lives have involved no contact
with economics or finance, either in their studies or in their previous professional
lives can understand the issues involved in lending policies, loan provisions and,
risk diversification among other key issues. The problem with the Cajas is thus
not politization, as most have argued in recent debates. Empirically this just does
not pan out: the worst offenders in this respect are the three Basque Cajas, whose
boards are entirely controlled by political parties, and show in fact exemplary
performance. But professionalization does clearly suggest itself as the key
lesson for the performance heterogeneity among Cajas. Having postgraduate
education, previous banking experience and no previous political appointments
makes a material difference in our analysis to several important aspects of the
performance of the Cajas.
Thus our study informs the current debate on the possible reforms of the
regulatory framework of the Cajas. In our view, our results suggest that two
key functions must be differentiated: running a Caja requires economic and fi-
nancial skills and knowledge; disbursing the benefits of the activity through the
foundation requires political control and intervention of the citizens. These two
functions call for two separate executive functions which should be differenti-
ated by law: the chairman of the Caja itself should be someone with advanced
knowledge of banking and finance; the chairman of the foundation (the Obra
Social) should be a representative of society who does not need to have advanced
expertise in the banking business.
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A Appendix: Robustness: Median Regression of Chair-
man Human Capital
 
Table A1: Chairman´s human capital and political background and performance (median regressions) 
Expl Variable Loans Real Estate Loans to Individuals 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
                  
Graduate Studies -2.346 -7.130**   7.893 4.940    
 (2.667) (3.419)   (10.47) (7.649)    
Public Office -4.502*  -2.791  2.007  4.677   
 (2.624)  (2.999)  (10.32)  (4.806)   
Banking 
Experience -3.891   -6.496** 5.586   2.214 
 (2.589)   (2.928) (9.812)   (6.663) 
Turnover (billion) -16.1 -28.7** -25.3* -9.41 36.3 36.8 40.5** 35.5 
 -11.8 -13.6 -12.4 -13.1 -42.7 -31 -15.1 -29.8 
Intercept 34.09*** 32.53*** 31.35*** 30.60*** 38.72*** 46.41*** 43.30*** 46.05*** 
 (2.068) (2.225) (2.171) (1.792) (7.966) (4.982) (3.395) (4.066) 
            
Observations 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
                  
         
Expl Variable Non Performing Loans Change in Rating (positive=increase) 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
                  
Graduate Studies -0.806 -1.581**    -9.10e-10 0.208**    
 (0.509) (0.745)    (0.0891) (0.0886)    
Public Office 1.041**  1.442*   -6.84e-10  0.210*   
 (0.489)  (0.793)   (0.0856)  (0.123)   
Banking 
Experience -1.619***   -1.230** 0.230***   0.230*** 
 (0.476)   (0.492) (0.0762)   (0.0584) 
Turnover (billion) 1.21 -2.47 -2.46 0.282 -4.21 -3.3 -0.215 -3.67 
 (0.329) (0.327) (0.357) (0.233) (0.674e9) (0.697 e9) (0.914) (0.522 e9) 
Intercept 4.270*** 4.652*** 3.168*** 4.516*** -0.230*** -0.208*** -0.207** -0.230*** 
 (0.432) (0.478) (0.597) (0.280) (0.0744) (0.0650) (0.0926) (0.0450) 
            
Observations 37 37 37 37 38 38 38 38 
 Note: Standard errors in parentheses     Source: Own collection from public information. 
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